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College football fans, coaches, and observers have adopted a set of beliefs about how college football
poll voters behave.  I document three pieces of conventional wisdom in college football regarding
the timing of wins and losses, the value of playing strong opponents, and the value of winning by wide
margins.  Using a unique data set with 25 years of AP poll results, I test college football's conventional
wisdom.  In particular, I test (1) whether it is better to lose early or late in the season, (2) whether teams
benefit from playing stronger opponents, and (3) whether teams are rewarded for winning by large
margins.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find that (1) it is better to lose later in the season than
earlier, (2) AP voters do not pay attention to the strength of a defeated opponent, and (3) the benefit
of winning by a large margin is negligible.  I conclude by noting how these results inform debates
about a potential playoff in college football.
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“Football represents and embodies everything that's great about this country.”  
- Wayne Woodrow “Woody” Hayes 
 
“When they look back at that 9-1 season, they don’t ask who the nine were.” 
-Gen. Robert Neyland 
 
 
College football occupies a singular place in the sports and cultural landscape.  Since Rutgers 
defeated Princeton (6-4) on November 6, 1869 college football has been a central part of both 
sports and collegiate folklore.
1  The reach of college football, when compared to other amateur or 
collegiate sports, is enormous.  The stadiums that house the major college football powerhouses 
dwarf their professional counterparts, with several stadiums seating more than 100,000 spectators, 
and even more teams with consecutive sellout records that top 200 games.
2  College football is also 
big business—revenues generated by college football average more than $35 million per school in 
some conferences and bowl appearances can net more than $15 million.  The sustained tradition, 
pageantry, media attention, and excitement generated by college football are arguably unmatched in 
any other major American sport.
3   
Part of this tradition is controversy, particularly when it comes to determining the best team 
in a given season.  Like most major sports, college football crowns a champion at the end of every 
season.  Unlike most major sports, college football does not have a playoff system or any other hard 
rules to determine a champion.  A key part of college football culture, then, is a never ending debate 
about which team in a certain year was truly better than all others.  While being listed as the number 
one team in the country in the final Associated Press (AP) or Coaches’ poll is seen by almost all 
                                                 
1 Although the game of American football has its origins in rugby, which developed in England in the middle of the 19th 
century, organized American football actually predates organized rugby in England. 
2 For example, Michigan’s Michigan Stadium has seated more than 100,000 spectators since 1956, and Nebraska’s 
Memorial Stadium (current capacity above 80,000) has been sold out for every home game since 1962.   On average, a 
team will play at home only 6 games per season—streaks of 200 or more imply home sellouts for more than 30 years.   
3 For example, more than half of all US televisions were tuned in to the Texas-Arkansas game in 1969, and the Army-
Navy game of 1926 attracted a crowd of more than 100,000 (MacCambridge 2005).  In some locations, polictics take a 
back seat to college football.  In 2006 the recount of the contested election in Ohio’s 15th congressional district was 
delayed by one day so that county election officials could watch the Ohio State-Michigan game.   
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observers to be a national championship, there are no set rules for how either the AP or the 
Coaches’ polls should determine which team is best.
4   
Since there are no formal rules for determining a champion, college football has adopted a 
set of “conventional claims” about what a team has to do to be ranked highly at the end of the 
season.  It is generally believed that a loss at the “wrong” time or a close victory over a “weak” 
opponent can cost a team a chance to claim a national title.  Moreover, observers have noted that it 
is better to lose early in the season rather than later, because a team’s later performance will weigh 
heavily in how others view a team.  Another piece of conventional wisdom is that a team is rewarded 
for playing (and winning against) strong opponents.  Lastly, some have noted that large margins of 
victory are necessary to obtain or retain a high ranking because such victories receive “style” points 
as they reflect a team’s dominance.   
  As with most pieces of conventional wisdom, the bases for these assertions are anecdotal, 
“everybody knows” stories.  Implicit in these assertions, however, are empirical claims that can and 
should be tested.
5  Even more, these claims embody implicit notions about how voters in the college 
football polls behave.  Since the plural of anecdote is not evidence, this paper takes these pieces of 
conventional wisdom seriously and is the first paper I am aware of that puts them to the test.  In 
particular, I test three pieces of college football’s conventional wisdom: (1) that it is better to lose 
earlier in the season than later in the season, (2) that teams are rewarded for playing stronger 
opponents, and (3) that winning by wide margins earns a team “style” points that result in improved 
rankings.   To test these propositions this paper exploits a newly created data set of week-by-week 
AP poll results for 25 of the most prominent college football teams over a 25 year period.  This large 
and rich source of data allows us to look at each of these pieces of conventional wisdom to see if 
what “everybody knows” turns out to be true empirically.   
                                                 
4 The NCAA lists ten organizations that bestow national championships in college football, some of them retroactively. 
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I find that the conventional wisdom of college football is wrong.  Rather than being 
penalized for losing later in the season, teams are actually rewarded for losing late in the season.  In 
fact, this premium for losing late is sizable— teams that lose late in the season are re-ranked higher 
by roughly 3/4 of AP poll voters than they would have been if they had lost early in the season.  
Even if one wished to argue that an early loss gives teams more time to make up ground in the 
rankings, the results here suggest that late losses leave teams with less ground to make up.  Similarly, 
defeating strong opponents does not yield any advantage in terms of ranking, but losing to strong 
opponents helps.  Margin of victory matters—but only if you lose.  While winning by large margins 
does not confer any ranking advantage (despite numerous claims to the contrary), losing by a 
blowout hurts, and losing to a strong team does not soften the blow.   
The lack of support for the conventional wisdom of college football does have implications 
for some current debates surrounding the sport.  Recently, sports enthusiasts have strengthened 
their calls for a playoff system in college football, and others have called for early-season team 
rankings to be banned.  These results suggest that determining a playoff based on the rankings of 
teams at the end of the season will need to be adjusted so as not to factor heavily the timing of 
losses (if the timing of a loss is exogenous to a team’s true quality).  As such, determining the four 
(or eight or sixteen) teams that would make a playoff could be complicated by the fact that the 
timing of losses matters.  Teams may be out of playoff contention if they lose an early game, yet 
remain in contention if they lose a game late in the season.   
What these findings imply for scheduling and conference alignments in the future, however, 
is unclear.  Since strength of the opponent is not a factor, teams may be better served by avoiding 
games against strong opponents throughout the season, and this can work to the advantage of teams 
in weak conferences and naturally to the disadvantage of teams from strong conferences and/or 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Fogel (1975) makes this same point about implicit quantitative claims in history.   
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non-conference schedules if strong opponents increase the probability of losing.   It may be 
beneficial, however, to schedule strong opponents later in the season.  Also, since large margins of 
victory are not rewarded in the AP rankings, teams have little incentive to “run up the score” on 
opponents, something coaches have claimed they must do to retain or obtain a high ranking.      
These results have implications beyond college football.  Tests of college football’s 
conventional wisdom are actually modified tests of voter behavior.  This paper offers a novel test of 
a particular type of behavioral model—the primitive voting model generated out of conventional 
wisdom.  Although the example here is highly structured and applies to college football only, our 
ideas about voting behavior in general are largely guided by conventional wisdom, but usually 
difficult to estimate empirically since popular elections are one-time only events.  Beyond a series of 
tests of voter behavior in college football, this paper makes another contribution.  Despite the large 
literature on college football rankings, particularly among statisticians and mathematicians (Callaghan 
et al. 2004), and the work about the efficiency of the rankings, particularly among economists (Fair 
and Oster 2007), little work exist that tests voter behavior in the rankings themselves.  While models 
of team rankings have been devised by a number of experts, we know little about how voters 
actually vote in the polls and what evidence they take as the most salient.   
I begin the next section with a brief history of college football and by documenting the three 
pieces of college football’s conventional wisdom that I later test, which are espoused by fans, 
coaches and sportscasters.  In particular, I use the narrative record— news reports, sportswriter 
columns, fan blogs and message boards—to establish the widespread nature of the conventional 
wisdom.  I then discuss the data that I assembled to test these propositions and present the central 
empirical results of the paper which refute the conventional wisdom of college football.  Next, I 
consider alternative specifications to test the robustness of the results, and I conclude by discussing 
what these results imply for current debates about a playoff in college football.   
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 I. College Football Facts and Myths 
A. College Football’s Evolution 
From its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, college football soon blossomed into a 
major American sport by the turn of the last century.  Since professional football did not begin in a 
sustained organized form until the 1920s, college football was the source of the sport’s origins and 
first innovations.  In fact, such standard features of the game as the line of scrimmage, first downs, 
and even the points awarded for scoring were all decided in college football’s formative years in the 
late nineteenth century.
6  The creation of mascots, fight songs, and the grouping of teams into 
leagues and conferences all took hold during college football’s formative years.  But college football 
at this time, even at the highest levels, was anything but the revenue generating spectacle that it is 
today.  Even into the early 20
th century, many prominent teams had no official coach, and most of 
those who coached did so on a part-time basis.  The sport was a particularly controversial feature on 
some college campuses due to its violent nature.  As early as 1905 President Roosevelt was 
threatening to ban the sport based on its brutality (more than 100 players had been killed in the 1905 
season), which led to the creation of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) to devise 
rules for the game.
7  Despite this threat, by the early twentieth century college football’s popularity 
was beyond question. 
The early years of the sport were dominated by private universities, in contrast to today’s top 
programs.  Although not officially a league until the 1950s, the Ivy League was the first power 
conference in college football—Harvard, Yale, and Princeton have a combined total of more than 
thirty national championships in the sport, the vast majority earned before the Great Depression.  
Concerns about the place of sports at these schools, however, led to an agreement in late 1945 that 
                                                 
6 For a basic introduction to the game of football by (and for) an economist, see Romer (2006).   
7 In the 1905 meeting between President Roosevelt and representatives from Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, it was 
suggested that the width of the playing field be increased by 40 feet to prevent injuries.  Harvard representatives rejected 
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signaled the beginning of the end of major college football at elite universities.  The Ivy Group 
Agreement ended football scholarships among the member schools, and in 1954 banned bowl 
games, spring practices, and decreed that student athletes should be “representative” of the student 
body.  While these schools de-emphasized the sport, other schools built up their programs, and by 
the mid-twentieth century college football’s popularity had been codified with larger-than-life 
coaches, storied rivalries, weekly polls (the AP poll began in 1936), bowl games (the Rose bowl has 
been played annually since 1916), national championships, and the formation of athletic conferences 
whose champions would compete in bowl games.   
Several features of what can be termed contemporary college football are fairly recent in 
origin, however.  Traditionally, the national champion was determined before the bowl season 
began, and historically few teams had the option of playing in the postseason.
8  Bowl games were 
seen, originally, as a prize for a well-played season.  In fact, the Big Ten conference began allowing 
more than one team to play in a bowl game in 1975, and the conference at one time did not allow 
back-to-back bowl appearances by the same team.
9  Notre Dame, under a multi-decade self-imposed 
“no bowl games” policy, would be crowned national champions more than five times while not 
appearing in any postseason matchups.  As such, the focus on bowl games and the postseason as a 
means of determining the best team in a given season is a recent phenomenon.  Similarly, while the 
power in college football has changed from elite private universities such as Harvard and Princeton 
to public universities such as Alabama and Oklahoma, other changes have sought to bring parity to 
                                                                                                                                                             
the idea since they had recently completed construction of Harvard Stadium.  As a compromise, the forward pass was 
invented (MacCambridge 2005).   
8 The AP began ranking teams after bowl games in 1965, and the Coaches’ poll began doing so five years later. 
9 This is largely due to the complaints of Michigan fans following a 10-10 tie in the 1973 Ohio State – Michigan game.  
The athletic directors of the schools in the Big Ten voted on who would represent the conference in the Rose Bowl, the 
only bowl the conference played in.  When Ohio State won the vote, Michigan fans and supporters complained, and 
eventually the conference allowed more bowl tie-ins.    
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the sport.
10  Beginning with scholarship restrictions, recruiting guidelines, the extension of the 
regular season to eleven games, and academic requirements in the 1970s, the NCAA brought about 
a new college football landscape, where teams with little or no tradition could gain a foothold if the 
administration was committed to developing a football program and if a program could recruit top 
athletes.
11       
The largest change in college football in its modern form is the exposure of the sport to a 
general audience.  In the early days of television, the NCAA decided which games would be 
broadcast.  Traditionally, the television coverage favored teams with strong national reputations and 
storied histories (such as Notre Dame or Michigan), and many individual teams, as well as 
conferences, wanted to allow consumers further choice.  The decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of 
University of Oklahoma and Georgia Athletic Association (1984) allowed college football conferences to 
schedule their own games.  This de-regulation, along with the growth of cable and satellite television 
outlets, meant that college football was now the focus of more television hours than ever before.  
The exposure of teams with less storied traditions has been most pronounced, and many teams that 
now count themselves among the established teams in the college football landscape (Miami (FL), 
Wisconsin and Virginia Tech, for example) did not have a large number of winning seasons before 
these institutional changes.
12  Another change brought about by college football’s massive media 
                                                 
10 Football is the only NCAA sport that sub-divides the Division I schools.  Beginning in 1978, Division 1A (now 
referred to as the bowl division) required (1) an average attendance of 15,000 per home game over a 2 year period, (2) 
that 60% of games be played against Division 1A opponents, and (3) the schools to grant athletic scholarships.  Division 
1AA (now referred to as the championship division, as this division’s champion is decided through an NCAA organized 
playoff) does not require scholarships or attendance minimums.   
11 Before the NCAA intervened, players could be offered scholarships and other incentives (up to and including pay) to 
be football players.  Originally, the NCAA sought to ban the practice of awarding athletic scholarships in 1947, but this 
was met with fierce resistance (and outright violations).  In 1951 the NCAA allowed scholarships, and also established 
rules for recruiting athletes.  The number of scholarships that could be offered was limited in 1977 to 95 scholarships.  
This has been reduced over time, and the football scholarship limit is currently 85.  Depken and Wilson (2006) show that 
NCAA enforcement increased the competitive balance of college football.    
12 Incidentally, conventional wisdom held that college football would be less competitive with the deregulation of 
television coverage.  For example, when Notre Dame signed its exclusive television contract with NBC in 1990 (effective 
for the 1991 season and renewed thereafter), it was widely believed that Notre Dame would dominate college football 
because they could ensure to any potential recruit that they would receive a large amount of television exposure (a major 
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exposure is the culture of college football itself—smaller rivalries are made known nationwide, 
teams with little traditions can rise to prominence, and recruits may choose to play for schools that 
will allow them to play earlier than those with deeper rosters. 
Against this backdrop, it was not until the 1970s that football achieved steady progress in 
racial integration.  In a sport that is now majority black at the highest levels (both college and 
professional) the exclusion (and later inclusion) of black athletes from certain teams’ rosters would 
obviously change the complexion of the game.  College football’s integration mirrored that of the 
rest of the country, with Texas’ 1969 national championship team the last all-white team to win a 
title.  While Miami and Kentucky (1966) did sign black players to their rosters in the 1960s, southern 
schools did not begin integrating their rosters, en masse, until the 1970s.
13   Before full integration, 
integrated teams would, by agreement, sit their black players when playing at the home site of a 
segregated team if a school so stipulated.
14  Racial segregation also created curious recruiting 
strategies, where integrated teams would recruit black southern athletes to their institutions because 
they would not be recruited by the major college football programs in their region.   
These changes have arguably heightened the drama of autumn Saturday afternoons.  As 
parity progresses the goal of a national championship is also arguably within the reach of more 
schools than ever before. The goal of every program is to position itself best to play for a national 
title once the bowl season begins.  While not losing any games is, without question, the best way to 
                                                                                                                                                             
recruiting point at the time).  Since Notre Dame signed the television contract in 1990 they have not won a national 
championship. Some of these claims are controversial, however, and products of conventional wisdom themselves—
Sutter and Winkler (2003) argue that scholarship limits have increased parity among the top 20 teams, but not overall.  
13 Resistance to integration in college football was pronounced.  In December of 1955, the governor of Georgia asked 
Georgia Tech to reject an invitation to the Sugar Bowl because their opponent, Pittsburgh, had black players on the 
roster.  Shortly thereafter, Louisiana legislators banned all colleges from competing against schools with black players.   
14 In college football mythology, the USC-Alabama game on September 12, 1970 holds special interest.  In that game, 
two USC African American running backs, Clarence Davis and Sam Cunningham torched the all-white Alabama squad 
42-21.  After the game, Alabama coach Paul “Bear” Bryant escorted Cunningham into the Alabama locker room and 
told his players “Gentlemen, this is what a football player looks like,” at which point each player rose to shake 
Cunningham’s hand.  While some have claimed that “Sam Cunningham did more to integrate Alabama in 60 minutes 
that night than Martin Luther King, Jr. accomplished in 20 years,” (MacCambridge 2005, p. 48), Bryant had already 
integrated Alabama football, signing a black running back, Wilbur Jackson, in the Spring of 1970.    
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accomplish that goal, it is actually rare that a team completes an entire season unscathed, and even 
rarer that two and only two teams do so.  Also, even if one does remain undefeated, it does not 
guarantee a spot in a desired bowl game—one can be shut out of the competition.
15  To accomplish 
this goal in light of the reality that teams with losses regularly end the season highly ranked, 
observers and fans have adopted “golden rules” (what I term here conventional wisdom) as to how 
a team can best position itself to be highly ranked in the polls at the end of the regular season.  Even 
if one does not make it to the designated “national championship” game, the gains to being close are 
substantial as BCS bowl appearances come with payouts in excess of $15 million.  These “golden 
rules” are largely a product of the recent, post 1970s college football landscape—they incorporate 
ideas of how teams should perform throughout the season to impress a subjective group of voters in 
polls that determine a team’s position in the hunt for a national title and major bowl berth.   
 
B. College Football’s Conventional Wisdom 
1. “If you’re going to lose, lose early” 
The conventional wisdom of college football dictates that teams who lose early in the season 
stand a better chance of being highly ranked at the end of the season than teams who lose later.  The 
logic is that teams who lose early have a greater opportunity to climb up in the polls after a loss, and 
also a greater chance of leapfrogging teams that lose at later points in time.  Also, since ranking in 
the polls reflects recent performance, it is better to avoid losses late in the season.  Similarly, the 
wisdom holds that voters view late losses unfavorably as they are a signal of low team quality.     
This view is widely held among fans and observers.  Below is a sampling of the logic offered 
by fans in sportsblogs and message boards, where this piece of conventional wisdom is most 
pronounced: 
                                                 
15 A recent example would be the undefeated Auburn team of the 2004 season.   
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“It is better to lose early than late.”
16
 
“Even if you follow the logic that one loss takes the college team out of contention, you still 
have flawed logic. When Michigan lost, there were dozens of people on here who said, ‘It's 




“There is a small part of me that would love to see that [Michigan in the Rose Bowl], just to 




“This season will demonstrate perfectly why it is better to lose early than late. It might make 
big time rivalries like Ohio State-Michigan move their matchup to early or mid-season so 
that both team still have a chance to recover and make the national championship game.”
19
 
“I still say all things being equal, if I am a coach with national championship aspirations, I 
would rather lose to an unranked team in week 5 than the number one team in week 10.”
20
 
“In college football, it is not about who you lose to, but when you lose. If you are going to 
lose, you always want to lose early. Pollsters have notoriously horrible memories.”
21
 
Fans are not the only ones to assert that losing early in the season is better than losing later.  Sports 
columnists have also made such claims. 
“The [LSU] Tigers haven't lost to the [Mississippi State] Bulldogs since 1999 - and they 
historically own them - but if you're going to lose, lose early.”
22
  
“However, if the [Georgia] Dawgs keep on winning, beat Florida, win the [Southeastern 
Conference] East [division], and upset LSU, then yeah…the South Carolina loss doesn’t look 
as bad.  The pollsters have short memories…That’s why the computers are so important in 
the BCS formula; they don’t care when you lose.”
23
 
“History has shown us that it is better to lose early than lose late.”
24
 
“If you lose a game, just make sure it isn’t close to the end of the season.”
25
 








22 Caparell (2007). 
23 Fiutak (2007). 
24 Reback (2007).  
25 Barra (2001). 
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“It used to be that you could lose early and come back into the national championship 
picture with some help. This year, however, there’s already been an inordinate amount of 
“help” being thrown around. So much so, that no more is needed. Teams just need to focus 
on taking care of their own business.”
26
The assertion that it is better to lose earlier in the season than later is an empirical assertion 
about how pollsters weigh wins and losses as a function of the week of the season in which they are 
played.  For example, many of the thoughts on this topic contain a notion that poll voters are 
“forgetful” or “myopic” in their behavior, to the extent that they weigh evidence differently.  In this 
way, the order of the signal matters.  The logic is that it is better to send a bad signal early than late 
because there are fewer opportunities to make up for it.   
The implicit ideas in this particular piece of conventional wisdom do contain pieces of recent 
economic models of behavior.  The conventional wisdom would be consistent by inference from the 
Law of Small Numbers, to the extent that if a promising team loses early, and promising teams have 
few loses, then losing early allows one to predict future wins with higher probability (Rabin 2002).  
Similarly, one could pose that there are issues of problems in Bayesian updating or projection bias 
(Lowenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin 2003). This notion of the value of the timing of a loss runs 
counter to the notion of confirmatory bias, however, because in that case later losses would be seen 
as particularly non-representative of a team’s quality (Rabin and Schrag 1999).   
 
2. There’s a Benefit to Playing (and Defeating) Strong Opponents 
All else equal, teams should be rewarded for playing (and defeating) opponents who have strong 
records.  While observers have long noted that this is true, the way in which opponent strength 
should be measured remains unclear.  By convention, one has played a strong team if that that team 
has a high winning percentage.  In the discussion of this issue, several terms are used, and here I use 
                                                 
26 Tamanaha (2007). 
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them interchangeably.
27  For example, one cannot have a “strong schedule” unless it includes 
“strong opponents,” and defeating “strong opponents” results in, by default, a “quality win.”  The 
BCS formula, in certain incarnations, took “strength of schedule” into account explicitly, and it has 
caused teams to remain interested in the records of their opponents long after the game has been 
played. 
Back when college football was propelled by clichés instead of a computer hard drive, 
Oklahoma Coach Bob Stoops would have stopped caring about Alabama about a 
millisecond after his Sooners polished off the Crimson Tide on Sept. 7. Coaches were taught 
to look straight ahead about the same time they first picked up a whistle. Stoops cares a lot 
about Alabama now. The Tide has won five of six games, including a 34-14 romp Saturday 
over Tennessee, and as a result, the Sooners have strengthened their lead in the latest Bowl 
Championship Series ranking.  
''You like to see those teams continue to win and go on and look good,'' Stoops said 
yesterday. Although they did not play over the weekend, the Sooners (7-0) have a better 
B.C.S. ranking and have a wider edge over Miami (7-0), which, at least according to the 
computer rankings, struggled in a 40-23 victory over West Virginia.
28
 
In the conventional wisdom, however, strength of opponents is already captured in the AP and 
Coaches’ polls.  In fact, some critiques of the BCS formula (which in its various incarnations has 
averaged the AP and Coaches’ polls and included computer rankings, bonus points for defeating 
highly ranked teams, and strength of schedule) have noted that the BCS’s explicit inclusion of 
opponent strength leads to a double counting of strength of schedule, since the Coaches’ and AP 
polls already take such factors into account.   
Simply, the polls and computers already account for schedule strength and “quality wins,” or 
else the three non-BCS one-loss teams would have placed in the top 6 in the 2003 BCS 
standings.  Some have argued that the BCS formula of including strength of schedule and 
quality wins explicitly led to a double countings since polls already included strength of 
opponents. One of the presumed motivations for including separate factors for schedule 
strength and quality wins was to reduce the assumed bias of the polls towards traditional 
football powers. However, as discussed above, the top non-BCS teams over the past six 
years were ranked similarly in the polls and computers. Therefore, one might rightly worry 
                                                 
27 For the purposes here, I am combining discussions of strength of schedule, opponent’s strength, and quality wins 
since the conclusions of these three lines of argument are the same.   
28 Caldwell (2002) 
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that the quality wins and schedule strength factors are making it harder for non-BCS schools 
to do well in the standings, as their schedules are typically ranked significantly lower and they 
have few opportunities for so-called “quality wins”.
29
 
The real argument among college football fans is not that quality wins or strength of opponents do 
not matter, but that pollsters do not weigh them correctly.  Indeed, the belief that strength of 
opponent is included in the ranking is implicit—what fans debate is why a particular team is ranked 
above/below another when it has a stronger/weaker strength of schedule.
30   
  Two important caveats to the discussion of strength of schedule are the roles of schedules 
themselves and of conferences.  First, it should be noted that college football schedules are decided 
many years in advance.  For example, the full schedules for the next three seasons are already posted 
for most major college football programs.   Since players only have a set amount of eligibility, and 
because the number of scholarships is limited, the quality of a future opponent, particularly well into 
the future, is unknown.  This also means that the quality of opponents in a given year may be weakly 
correlated with the scheduler’s intent—one cannot predict the future quality of a team when they do 
not know who the majority of the players will be.  To that end, a team that devised to create a weak 
schedule may inherit a strong one through no fault of their own.  Secondly, teams play a significant 
number of their games within a conference, whose strength in any given year is not known.   
 
3. Margin of Victory Matters 
Even before the BCS incorporated (and later discarded) the use of margin of victory in its poll, it 
was widely held that teams should win by large margins as a sign of their dominance.
31  Good teams, 
it is argued, should win by large margins, especially when playing against weak opponents.  Poll 
                                                 
29 Callaghan, et al. (2004) 
30 Indeed, the discussion of this points among fans and commentators is so pronounced that it is a topic among itself 
among fans. For example, most college football message boards and columnists will discuss which conference is 
stronger than another, and which teams have the “toughest” schedules.   
31 The original BCS formula incorporated margin of victory in the 1998 to 2001 seasons.   
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voters, it is argued, take such margins of victory into account.  As with the previous two pieces of 
conventional wisdom, blogs and message boards are rife which such speculations.  Unlike the other 
pieces of conventional wisdom, however, college football coaches openly admit that they believe 
(and play under the assumption of) this conventional wisdom.  In fact, even after margin of victory 
was eliminated from the computer polls used in the BCS formula, coaches admitted that impressing 
voters in the “human polls” (such as the AP poll) required them to think about margin of victory. 
Just because Steve Spurrier is in the National Football League and the computers used for 
the Bowl Championship Series no longer calculate margin of victory does not mean that 
college football teams have become more compassionate and less points-crazy against 
overmatched opponents. Before the season, the coaches successfully campaigned for the 
elimination of the margin of victory component used by some of the B.C.S. computer 
services. The theory was that, if the rankings formula did not reward running up the score, 
why would a coach risk injury to his players and embarrassment to an opponent by pouring 
it on late in a game?  
‘It was the right thing to do,’ Tennessee Coach Phillip Fulmer said. ‘I know from first-hand 
experience when that is in the back of your mind and you're up 21 points in the fourth 
quarter or 14 points in the fourth quarter.’ Several coaches said margin of victory may have 
been eliminated from the software this season, but not from the hardware of human beings.  
Georgia Coach Mark Richt, whose Bulldogs are 4-0 and No. 3 in The Times's ranking, says 
voters in the Associated Press news media poll and USA Today/ESPN coaches poll still take 
final scores into account. ‘I think people still vote on the impressiveness of the win,’ Richt 
said.  
Texas Coach Mack Brown agrees, noting that his Longhorns (4-0) jumped over Oklahoma 
to No. 2 in the news media poll this week after defeating Tulane, 49-0. The Longhorns did 
not run it up on the Green Wave; Brown pulled his first team early in the fourth quarter 
when Texas was ahead by 28-0. But he understands the impact the box score had on voters 
the next day.  
‘If we beat Tulane, 7-6, we would have dropped in the polls,’ Brown said. South Carolina 
Coach Lou Holtz said he is often torn between compassion for the other team and wanting 
his reserves to improve.  
‘I really believe as long as the other team is trying to score, you have an obligation to let your 
second team try and score,’ Holtz said.
32
    
Even well after the BCS discarded margin of victory, coaches admitted that they believed that 
margin of victory was an important component of how their team would be perceived. 
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Major college football’s reliance on subjective polls to determine a national champion also 
plays a part in how teams manage blowouts. 
“With the BCS and all the ramifications that come with the rankings,” Tennessee coach 
Phillip Fulmer said, “they have basically put you in position to make you get your team to 
look as dominant as you can.”
33
 
This has caused some fans and sportswriters to encourage teams to win by large margins, or to 
assert that poll voters pay more attention to teams that win by wide margins.  However, some 
pollsters have noted that wide margins of victory are not needed to send the message that a team is 
dominant. 
  Voters are easily drawn to victory margins like 79-10.
 34
"A 28-0 or a 42-10 victory is impressive enough for me," says Kirk Bohls, a writer for the 
Austin (Texas) American-Statesman and a voter in The Associated Press poll last year. "If 
anything, I am turned off by a 70-0 score and investigate whether the winning team 
consciously ran up the score.... That's the ultimate turnoff to me as a voter."
35
The key here is that coaches are working under the perception that the margin of victory matters in 
the minds of the pollsters who will determine their team’s ranking on a week-to-week basis.  Like 
the other claims noted above—we should see if this concern noted by the coaches (which is 
independent of the BCS poll’s explicit inclusion of margin of victory) is true empirically. 
 
II. Data and Empirical Strategy 
To test the conventional wisdom described above I assembled a dataset that contains the 
weekly game and ranking information for 25 of college football’s most prominent programs for the 
25 seasons from 1980 to 2004.
36  In all, the data contains information on more than 6,000 football 
games.  I have information not only on the features of the team on a week-by-week basis, but also 
                                                                                                                                                             
32 Drape (2002) 
33 Russo (2007) 
34 http://www.bleacherreport.com/articles/2849-College_Football-Pulling_Rank_How_the_Polls_Should_Work-
141007 
35 Dienhart (2002) 
36 See the data appendix for further details. 
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information on their opponents—critical for testing claims that strength of opponent matters in 
determining rankings.  While some studies have looked at end of season rankings over long time 
periods (Langellet 2003, Sutter and Winkler 2003), and others have looked at weekly poll 
progressions for short time periods (Goff 1996, Lebovic and Sigelman 2001, Campbell, et al. 2007, 
Paul, et al. 2007), this is the first study that looks at over 20 years of weekly data for such a large 
number of teams, and is also the first study to look at the effect of a large number of game 
characteristics on voting outcomes.
37   
Table 1 shows the 25 teams included in the analysis.  The data contains information on all but 5 
teams who claimed any share of a national title from 1980 to 2004.
38 Earlier, I argued that college 
football’s current incarnation begins sometime after the 1970s due to the institutional changes taking 
place in the sport, although some changes came later (such as television de-regulation).  While starting in 
1980 is somewhat arbitrary, it is at a point in time that is late enough for many of the changes begun in 
the 1970 to have an effect on the game.  Similarly, since the focus here is on test of the rankings in 
college football, the sample is biased towards teams that were highly likely to be ranked for a majority of 
the time covered.  Care was taken to produce a geographically balanced set of teams, and all major 
regions of the nation (as well as all major conferences) are represented in the data.  The data contains 
the date of the game, score of the game, location of the game (home, away or neutral), opponent, 
                                                 
37 Previous studies have looked at how rankings evolve over a season and not what features poll voters take as most 
important.  Goff (1996) looks at final season ranking as a function of mid and preseason ranking, and Lebovic and 
Sigelman (2001) also look at inertia in the polls.  See Paul, et al. (2007), Campbell, et al. (2007), and Frechette, et al. 
(2007) for examples of work that uses smaller samples of AP poll statistics.   
38 Of the five teams not included in the data that won a national championship, Southern Methodist University (SMU) 
was beset with an NCAA “death penalty” in 1986 that devastated the football program. Since SMU was already on 
NCAA probation fore recruiting violations (1985-1988), the second set of charges that surfaced in 1986 led the NCAA 
to issue the most severe sanctions allowed.  The penalty was severe, not only the loss of scholarships (55 scholarships 
over a 4 year period), but the 1987 season was cancelled and the 1988 season called for only a limited number of away 
games to be played (SMU cancelled this season as well).  All television games and bowl appearances for SMU football 
were disallowed during the 1988 and 1989 seasons.  In addition, SMU players could transfer to another school without 
having to wait a probationary season to play (which is the procedure under normal NCAA rules).  Since the sanctions by 
the NCAA, SMU has had one winning season (1997-1998, going 6-5), and several commentators believe that the SMU 
“death penalty” led to the collapse of the Southwestern Conference  due to lost revenues (and, through its demise, the 
emergence of superconferences such as the SEC and Big 12).    
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opponent’s record at the time the game was played, opponent’s record for that season, the team’s and 
opponent’s ranking before and after the game in the AP poll. 
  The AP has ranked football teams continually since 1936.  AP teams are ranked by way of a 
Borda count with a set (fixed) number of press representatives voting every week of a season, usually 
chosen to be geographically diverse.  Each week members rank teams from 1 to 25 in a ballot.  In 
calculating points, teams ranked first receive 25 points, those ranked second 24 points and so on.  The 
team with the most points in that week's ranking is therefore ranked first.  AP voters are explicitly 
instructed to base their votes on performance, not a team’s stature or speculation, and they are told that 
it is perfectly acceptable to make significant changes in the ballot from week to week (Mandel 2007).  
For the team ranked first in a given week there is little disagreement in general. While this would seem 
to imply that the voting is fair for all ranks, Borda counts can be manipulated by ranking teams 
differently, but AP ballots are not secret and have never been (Wieberg 2005).  As such, AP voters have 
been regularly interviewed throughout the season about why they ranked teams as they did.  While this 
does not eliminate sources of potential bias, it does act to reduce it.
39     
There are some limitations with the data at hand.  For example, it does not include many teams 
from “mid major” conferences, and as such the conclusions that one may wish to apply to all teams 
should be tempered.  Similarly, the data here will have little to say about programs that were competitive 
for a short number of years or teams that have not had many winning seasons.  In short, the data here 
speaks to the most successful programs in college football for the last quarter century.  As that is the 
focus of the conventional wisdom, however, such narrow attention is warranted. 
                                                 
39 The Coaches’ Poll is not used because the ballots were not released publicly until the last regular season ballot of the 
2005 season.  Similarly, the Coaches’ Poll has been criticized because there is evidence that the coaches themselves do 
not fill out the ballots (Barnhart 1998) and that coaches have a strong bias towards their own teams, the teams in their 
conference, and their other opponents (Mandel 2005). But, as recently stressed by Buchanan and Yoon (2006) it is not 
possible to assert that there is no bias in the AP poll, particularly when pollsters achieve a surprising amount of 
consensus with regards to the number one team so often.   
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  Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the key variables used in the following analysis.  Teams 
are much more likely to win than lose, as expected from this sample, and the average margin of victory 
is 9 points, with the teams in the sample scoring around 4 touchdowns per game.   I define a “blowout 
win” here as winning by more than 17 points (two touchdowns, two extra points, and one fieldgoal), 
and these victories happen more than half of the time.  Teams lose by more than 17 points about 10% 
or the time.  A “close win” is winning by less than three points (less than the value of a fieldgoal), and 
these types of victories are relatively rare, and so are “close losses.” 
  One would like to think that a teams ranking reflects an expectation about a team’s quality, and 
that a team ranked above another would have a high probability of defeating that team.  Previous 
research, however, has shown that rankings actually perform poorly as predictors of victory—betting 
lines do much better (Fair and Oster 2007, Paul et al. 2007).  The claims made about rankings, however, 
do not assume nor do they require that rankings themselves be best predictors of who will win a head-
to-head match up.  The key problem for rankings, however, is that they begin at an initial value and 
change over the season.  Ideally, we would like to match teams and have them differ only in one way 
(such as the timing of their losses) to test these claims.  It is not possible, however, to do such a paired 
comparison, so another method is needed.
40   
At the heart of each piece of conventional wisdom is the idea that some feature of a game—the 
time of the season it is played, the strength of the opponents, the margin of victory—have a larger effect 
on the change in ranking than other features that may vary over a season.  Since the AP poll ranks teams 
based on the points each team is awarded by voters, looking at the changes in points is equivalent to 
                                                 
40 While one could imagine matching teams based on their rankings for successive year (the number 5 ranked team in 
1980 and the number 5 team in 1981), those teams themselves will play different teams, contain different personnel, etc. 
As such, differences we may or may not find due to differences based on the timing of losses, for example, will be 
suspect to numerous criticisms.  Here, I make no causal claims, and only look at the relationship between the measures 
of interest and AP point changes, controlling for these other features that may influence the relationship.  
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looking at changes in rankings.
41  Also, since higher point totals lead to higher rankings, the 
interpretation is more intuitive than for rankings.
42  We can think then, of the points in the AP poll as a 
function of the characteristics games played and the initial number of points   









k t P P E β
Where P is the points for the team in the AP poll in the preseason poll (0) and week t, and Γ is a set of 
game characteristics (win, loss, opponent strength, etc.).  I test for the conventional wisdom by looking 
at the relationship between game characteristics and changes in AP point-totals.  Since teams play one 
game only between rankings, this strategy will capture the relationship between game characteristics and 
AP point changes.
43 In particular, I test the conventional wisdom outlined above with 
(2)                        ( ) β Γ = − −1 t t P P E  
where I regress the change in AP points from week t-1 to t on the characteristics of the game played 
between t-1 and t.     
Each of the pieces of conventional wisdom can be used to generate hypotheses about what we 
would expect the sign of β to be for some game characteristic.  If losing late in the season is worse than 
losing earlier in the season then losing late would result in a large, negative effect on point changes.  This 
would reflect the fact that teams would be downranked more for losing later in the season.  As such we 
would expect the coefficient on losing late to negative.  If opponent strength mattered to voters teams 
would be awarded more points for defeating strong opponents, so the conventional wisdom 
hypothesizes that the coefficient on defeating a strong opponent would be positive.  If teams were 
                                                 
41 Campbell et al. (2007) and Paul et al. (2007) are recent studies of football ranking points, but they use a small number 
of variables and are not concerned with game characteristics themselves.    
42 See the appendix for ranking results.   
43 It is very rare, but in the beginnings of some seasons teams may play two games before the first updated ranking in 
released.  This is so rare, however, that it does not effect the results discussed below.   
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“rewarded” for decisive victories then defeating opponents by wide margins would result in a gain in 
points, so the coefficient on blowout victories should be positive.   
 
III. Empirical Results 
A. Central Findings 
 
  Table 3 shows the base specifications for the tests employed here.  As a first check, column I 
shows that wins increase the number of AP points, and losses decrease the number of points in the 
following poll.  Column III adds close and blowout wins and losses as well as opponent strength.  
Blowout losses matter—a team loses about 20% more points if they lose by a wide margin but there is 
no benefit to winning by a wide margin—the effect of a blowout win is not statistically different from 
zero. While close wins are not rewarded or punished, close losses help—they reduce the change in 
points from losing by about 10%.  Opponent strength does seem to matter, each additional win by an 
opponent increases the points in the next ranking by 5 points.  But playing a strong opponent should 
have a small impact relative to defeating a strong opponent.  In Column IV I interact winning and losing 
with opponent strength, and opponent strength and defeating a strong opponent have no effect on AP 
point changes.  Losing to a strong opponent helps, but the effect is only marginally significant. Column 
V includes an indicator for winning or losing late in the season.  Late in season is defined here as greater 
than or equal to the tenth poll-week of the season.  For most college football seasons, this week comes 
as the last week of October or first week of November, and well more than 2/3 of the games for the 
season have been played.
44  Teams will have, on average, 3 or 4 more games to play to complete the 
season.  While winning late in the season has no effect on changes in AP points, losing late in the season 
actually benefits teams—the cushion provided by losing late in the season is around 20% of the value of 
losing.  Given the point estimate in Table 3 and the number of AP poll voters, losing late in the season 
implies that more than 3/4 of AP poll voters rank a team one place higher in their rankings after a late 
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season loss than for an early season loss.
45  In fact, if one were to lose in a blowout at the end of the 
season, the net result would not be that different from losing by a small margin early in the season.   
  Each piece of conventional wisdom is rejected in the results of Table 3.  Losing later in the 
season actually benefits teams; opponent strength does not matter, win or lose; and blowout victories do 
not result in any “style” points.  In fact, the evidence that we do have points strongly in the opposite 
direction.  Rather than significantly hurting teams, losing late in the season actually helps them—it 
lessens the blow of a loss significantly.  Similarly, while defeating a strong opponent does not help, 
losing to a strong opponent actually softens the blow of a loss.  For example, losing to a team with an 8-
3 record would actually decrease the negative point change from losing by more than 15% of the change 
for a loss.  Lastly, rather than blowout wins helping, close losses actually help, and blowout losses hurt 
the most.  All told, the conventional wisdom of college football has little empirical support. 
  It could be that the effects described in Table 3 actually obscure the important interactions 
between the effects.  For example, losing late in the season against a strong opponent in an away game 
might mitigate the effect of losing late.  To consider the possibility that these interactions play a role in 
the results Table 4 presents estimates where late games are interacted with other characteristics.
46  The 
primary results are robust to the inclusion of these interactions.  For example, the effect of a loss later in 
the season is still large and statistically significant.  In terms of blowout wins and losses, winning late in a 
blowout against a strong opponent at an away game actually hurts a team, although the size of this effect 
is small.  The effect of losing in a close game while playing at the opponent’s field is negative, but 
playing against a strong opponent helps.  For example, losing a close game late in the season to a strong 
(8-3 record) opponent at their field would result in losing about 100 fewer points that if one lost to an 
                                                                                                                                                             
44 For example, teams will usually play their 8th or 9th game by the tenth poll week.  Considering that teams now play 11 
or 12 games, this implies that ¾ or more of the schedule has been played.  
45 Although it varies from year to year, the average number of AP voters from 1980 to 2004 was 65.  
46 This was done in Table 3 but the results not shown due to space limitations. 
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opponent with an even record.  But this is somewhat counter to the conventional wisdom, strength of 
the opponent matters, but only when you lose.  
 
B. Robustness  
  Before turning to the specification tests of the central findings, it is useful to check the validity 
of the results to some general robustness checks.  I do this in three ways, (1) I check for the robustness 
of the results based on a team’s previous point change and the sequence of those point changes, (2) I 
check the results by the length of winning streak, and (3) I included fixed team and season effects and 
cluster the standard errors.   
The results of Table 3 could be due to the fact that teams’ previous results are over-represented.  
For example, the results for losing late could be positive because they would represent a second loss, 
which may be weighted differently than the first.  To check to see if the results are sensitive to previous 
results, I estimated regressions similar to those in Table 3 conditioned on the sign of previous point 
changes (a weaker condition than conditioning on previous wins or losses).  Table 5 shows the results by 
the sign of a team’s lagged point change.  As the Table shows, the results are not sensitive to how a 
team’s points have previously evolved.  Even more, they are robust to different ordering of the point 
changes the prior two weeks.  This is also an encouraging check that conditioning on point changes 
captures the relationship between the current game’s characteristics and the point change.     
The results of Table 3 could be due to an over-representative of teams with long winning 
streaks.  To deal with this issue, Table 6 shows the results by the length of the winning streak.  We 
would expect that, if a long winning streak is an indication that a team is of high quality, that 
characteristics that negatively impact a point change would be lessened for teams with long winning 
streaks, although how much this should matter would depend on the particular specification of voting 
behavior.  Table 6 shows that to be the case in some instances.  While teams with long winning streaks 
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do not benefit more from a close loss, there is a slight benefit from losing to a strong opponent given a 
longer winning streak.  The largest positive effect is for losing late in the season.  Teams who manage to 
string together a number of consecutive wins receive the largest benefit to losing late.   
  As a last check, we should relax the assumption that each week of each season is a separate, 
independent observation.  That obviously cannot be true.  For example, there may be years in which 
pollsters act in a way that is different from other years, or teams that are perennially over-ranked or 
under-ranked, or weeks of the season that become “shakedown Saturdays” where the prominent teams 
of the season separate themselves from the rest of the pack.  Also, many teams in the data play one 
another, such that a win for one team will be a loss for another.  While this is not a double counting, per 
se (for example, each team will have its own point change, opponent strength, etc.), it does imply that 
the outcomes for some teams will be highly correlated when they play one another.  I deal with these 
possibilities in three ways.  First, I estimate the regression with team and season effects.  That is, 
Michigan may be a perennially over-ranked team (a team effect), and 1987 could have been a year of low 
rankings due to significant disagreement amongst the pollsters (a season effect).  Secondly, I interact 
team and season effects to create team-season effects, where now each team, season, and team-season 
have their own fixed effects.  Lastly, I cluster the standard errors by season (to adjust for correlation by 
season), by team (to adjust for correlation of team quality/performance over successive weeks and 
seasons), and by week of season (to adjust for the correlation when one team in the data plays another) 
to see if the result is robust to these concerns.
47  Table 7 presents the results.  The addition of the team 
and season effects changes some of the results.  For example, blowout wins do confer an advantage in 
this specification.
48 Similarly, the benefits of close losses cease to be statistically significant once 
clustered standard errors are included.  The results for blowout losses and opponent strength remain, as 
                                                 
47 In the terminology of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), this type of clustering produces an arbitrary variance 
covariance matrix which is consistent in the presence of any type of correlation within the cluster over time.   
48 As we will see later this result is not robust to alternative specifications.   
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do the results for late losses.  Overall, the results are not especially sensitive to the inclusion of team or 
season effects, but others are sensitive to clustered errors.     
 
IV. Specification Checks 
A. Checks for Timing of Losses 
 
  The result that teams actually benefit by losing later in the season, relative to those that lose 
earlier, can be checked in two ways.  First, Table 8 gives the summary statistics by different definitions 
of “late in the season.”  In the results presented earlier, late in the season was defined as the tenth week 




th weeks as the starting dates for late in the season.  
Table 8 shows that, relative to the season overall, later games are not more or less likely to result in 
victory or defeat, and the tenth and later weeks are not unique.  Scores of teams and their opponents, 
the likelihood of a blowout or close win are the same as for the season overall.  If I define late in the 
season as the 8
th week or later, the summary measures are the same as if I define late in the season as the 
11
th week or later.  To confirm the robustness of the result to the alternative definitions, I replicated the 
regression of Table 3 for these alternative definitions of late in the season.  Table 9 shows the results.  
While the result remains, there is a change in the magnitude, and the value of losing later in the season is 
anywhere from 10% to 18% of the value of losing, depending on the specification.  Recalling the 
discussion of the conventional wisdom, this result is still surprising—the conventional wisdom 
supposed that the result should be negative and large, and Table 9 confirms that the result is large and 
positive under these alternative definitions of late weeks of the season.   
 
B. Checks for Opponent Strength 
 
  How can we be sure that the results for opponent strength truly reflect a lack of attention to the 
quality of the opponent?  One check would be to use alternative definitions of opponent strength. When 
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I replicated the results of Table 3 with opponent strength defined as wins minus losses at the time the 
game was played the results were unchanged—this is likely due to the fact that the current win/loss 
record is highly correlated with the season win/loss record, particularly after the first few games of the 
season are played, and as such is not a strong check of the results.  To see if teams were rewarded for 
playing (and defeating) strong opponents I replicated the results of Table 3 using only the sample of 
teams that played another ranked team.  I do this check because it could well be that AP voters do not 
factor strength of the opponent, but they may factor “quality wins,” victories over teams that are highly 
ranked, which would be a select number of strong opponents.  Table 10 shows the results.  Here, I 
include the rank of the opponent inverted, so that a team ranked tenth receives an “opponent rank” 
measure of 1/10 and a team ranked second receives a value of 1/2.  Winning against a ranked opponent 
confers no advantage, and losing against a ranked opponent confers no advantage.  Even including the 
strength of the opponent here does not improve the results.  One problem with the use of inverted rank 
is that it is not possible to interpret the effect in a straightforward manner.  To overcome this difficulty I 
replicated the results of Table 10 using the log of the inverted rank and the results were similar.  For 
example, in a specification that was similar to column I of Table 10 the coefficient on winning * the 
logged inverted rank was -18.18 [-0.40] and the coefficient on losing * the logged inverted rank was -
33.42 [-0.74] (t statistics in brackets).  Also, when I use the measure of strength of opponent and restrict 
the sample to ranked teams, opponent’s strength has no effect.
49  
 
C. Checks for Margin of Victory 
 
  In the specifications presented so far margin of victory was a dichotomous measure that 
indicated a close or wide point differential.  Controlling for team and season effects seemed to suggest 
                                                 
49 In regression similar to those of Table 10 where I restrict the sample to be of ranked teams playing ranked teams (and 
where I do not include measures of the opponent’s rank) the coefficient on opponent strength is 1.64 [0.14], the 
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that blowing teams out did result in some style points, although other specifications did not.  Another 
way to see if margin of victory matters is to use the actual point differential in the specification rather 
than dichotomous indicators.  Table 11 shows the results.  Column I shows that the point differential 
has no effect, and that defeating a strong opponent by a wide margin may actually cost a team points.  
Recall, however, that losing by wide margins appeared to be particularly negative, so there may be a 
difference for winning margins (M>0) and losing margins (M<0).  I account for this by separating the 
effects for winning margins of victory and losing margins of victory.  Column III-VI shows the results.  
In all of the specifications, margin of victory does not have a statistically significant relationship with 
point differentials, confirming the results of Table 3.  Interacting margin of victory (defeat) with 
opponent strength does result in a statistically significant relationship.  Losing by wide margins to strong 
opponents hurts (note that losing differential is a negative), which is consistent with the results for 
blowout losses discussed earlier.  Curiously, defeating strong opponents by wide margins cost points as 
well.   For example, if a team defeated a 8-3 record team by 20 points they would actually lose close to 
20 points in the subsequent poll.  Conversely, losing to the same team by the same margin would result 
in a 50 fewer points in the next poll.  At the extreme, one could say that the results of Table 11 are 
consistent with the fact that teams should win by large margins (M>>0) against weak opponents 
(opponent strength <<0), but the results also imply that it is better, in terms of points, to lose by a large 
margin (M<<0) to a weak opponent (opponent strength <<0).  For example, defeating a 3-8 record 
opponent by 20 points results in (M=20, opponent strength = -5) results in a point gain of 20 points.  
However, losing to a 3-8 opponent by 20 points (M= -20, opponent strength = -5) results in a gain of 
more than 50 points.  These specifications suggest that the combination of margin of victory with 
opponent strength may matter in curious ways that we might not have realized previously, but margin of 
victory itself is not substantially related to point changes in the AP poll.  
                                                                                                                                                             
coefficient on winning * opponent strength is 0.42 [0.04], and the coefficient on losing * opponent strength is 12.89 
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V. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The conventional wisdom offered by pundits regarding college football has little empirical 
support—and in some instances is exactly the opposite of what “everyone knows” is true.  Instead of 
teams suffering more for losing later in the season, a late season loss actually cushions the blow.  Rather 
than being rewarded for defeating strong opponents, AP voters seem not to pay attention to the 
strength of a defeated opponent.  Similarly, margin of victory seems to matter little in how AP voters 
choose to reward a team’s performance.  The results presented in this paper showed that the failure of 
the conventional wisdom is robust to a number of specification checks and alternative definitions.   
The lingering question is how such conventional wisdom persists despite the strong evidence to 
the contrary.  One feature of the pieces of conventional wisdom outlined above is their insistence on the 
use of anecdote to establish their claims.  For example, here is what one sportswriter said about the 
importance of margin of victory 
Yes, sportsmanship matters, and there's no room in some voters' minds for rubbing it in. 
Still, it's important to win by a comfortable margin if you can. Just ask Penn State.  In 1994, 
the Nittany Lions roared into Bloomington, Ind., with a 7-0 record for a date with Indiana. 
Penn State was ranked No. 1 ranking and had an eye on the national championship. The 
Nittany Lions got off to a dominating start and built a comfy lead, but Indiana notched 
several second-half scores to narrow the final margin to 35-29, making Penn State's game 
against an unranked foe look more competitive than it was. As a result, unimpressed voters 




This anecdote is used to claim that the general strategy of winning by wide margins is rewarded, 
although I find no evidence that that is true.  Similar anecdotal-based claims about other features of 
conventional wisdom tested here are common.  Note also that this claim embodies more than one piece 
of conventional wisdom—Indiana was an unranked opponent, and voters took into account not only 
margin of victory but how strong the opponent was.  This reflects, in my view, the standard practice of 
                                                                                                                                                             
[1.08]—t statistics in brackets.   
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inferring, incorrectly, from small samples.  Indeed, the conventional claims made here could be 
classified, in a somewhat loose way, as beliefs by those who draw inferences from the law of small 
numbers.  Rabin (2002) documents the fact that agents may, if the distribution of signals is unknown, 
over infer from the present signal.  In the case of college football, one would derive their beliefs based 
on a few salient outcomes and then claim that those outcomes (which may themselves be the result of 
an accurately described phenomena) apply more generally.  In other words, it may well be true that Penn 
State’s drop in the polls in the 1994 season was the result of voters looking negatively upon their margin 
of victory over Indiana, but it is a far leap to conclude that it matters for ranked teams in general. 
  This leads to a second way in which the conventional wisdom could be related to belief 
formation—salience.  In most claims in support of conventional wisdom, stories from the past are 
usually focused on teams that were very highly ranked, and yet the claims of conventional wisdom are 
quite general.  It is difficult to say why and how this conventional wisdom develops, but these two 
explanations are consistent with its widespread persistence in college football.  Perhaps due to its rich 
and colorful history, college football gives rise to stories and anecdotes that become “truths” without 
any careful consideration.    
Beyond the conventional wisdom tests themselves, these results also inform some current 
debates in college football.   While the BCS system (begun in 1998) is designed to produce a national 
championship game where the #1 and #2 ranked teams play against one another, the system has not 
avoided controversy.  As such, proponents of a playoff have argued for some time that a 4, 8, or 16 
team playoff is needed to “truly” determine the national champion.  If any system were to determine the 
final 4 or 8 teams who would play for a championship, it is likely to be similar to the current BCS 
formula, and only different to the extent that it incorporates more teams in a playoff system.  Since such 
a system is likely to use polls to rank the teams that would qualify for the playoff, the results here should 
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be noted if it is believed that they may inappropriately help or hurt some teams.  For example, in the 
final regular season poll for the 2006 season, the point difference between the team ranked #4 (LSU) 
and #5 (Louisville) was 32 points, and the difference between #4 (Ohio State) and #5 (Notre Dame) in 
2005 was 48 points.  As such, the results here, where losing late in the season can save upwards of 50 
points, would have implications for who would be allowed to play for a national championship as long 
as rankings were based on polls.  The stakes of these cutoffs are potentially quite high.  For example, 
appearing in a BCS bowl nets a team more than $15 million, while the next largest bowl payout is less 
than $5 million. 
    In the end, shedding light on the conventional wisdom of college football has several benefits.  
First, it gives us an opportunity to test simple, primitive models of voting behavior that are grounded in 
conventional wisdom.  Second, it provides strong evidence that our received wisdom about voting is 
often wrong, even in trivial matters such as the ranking of amateur football teams and the determination 
of a mythical champion.  Third, these results may help us to devise a system of ranking teams and 
choosing a champion, where the stakes, for individual universities, can be quite high.  Fourth, they allow 
us to see relationships in the voting behavior of AP pollsters that was previously undetected, and this 
may itself induce changes in voting procedures or policies.  All of this however, is simply a side show to 
the main event; the actual games played around the country are the true heart and soul of college 
football and the primary reason for its enduring popularity. 
Everybody knows that.  
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Data Appendix 
      The data used in this paper was collected from two sources.  The ESPN College Football 
Encyclopedia (MacCambridge 2005) was used to obtain all information except AP poll points, which were 
obtained from the website www.soonerstats.com, which is the website that the editor of the ESPN 
College Football Encyclopedia used for the historical AP poll progressions.
51  The Encyclopedia lists the 
date of the game, the location of the game, the opponent, the score, and the ranking of the team and the 
opponent before and after the game.  Cross-checks in the Encyclopedia allowed us to gather the 
win/loss record for each opponent at the time of the game and for that season.  For the analysis, each 
game of each season for all 25 teams was recorded, whether they were ranked or unranked at the time of 
the game. In addition to this raw data from the Encyclopedia and the points from the AP poll, the 
following variables were created: 
 
  --  "Close Win/Loss" is defined as a margin of victory of 3 points or less.  Ties are listed separately and 
are not included. 
  --  "Blowout Win/Loss" is a margin of victory of more than 17 points (this means winning by more 
than two touchdowns, two point-after-touchdowns, and one field goal). 
  --  "Opponent Strength (Season)" is the number of victories minus the number of losses for an 
opponent that season.   
  --  "Opponent Strength (Game)" is the number of victories minus the number of losses for an 
opponent at the time that they played the game in the data. 
  --  "Week of Season" is the poll-week of the season.  Since the preseason poll is a ranking of teams 
before any games are actually played, I note this as the zero week of the season. 
 
      Changes in points and rankings are taken as week to week changes (e.g., the points/ranking 
from week three minus the points/ranking from week two) and the covariates in all models use the 
actual week of the event (e.g., the change from week two to three is regressed on the game 
characteristics of the game played between the second and third week rankings).  As there are more 
weeks of the season than games played by any individual team, there are "bye" weeks in which a team in 
inactive and their rank may change.  Since these weeks contain no information about a given team (since 
they have not played an opponent in the interim) they are not used in this analysis.  However, it must be 
noted that if their ranking changed this would be reflected in the data.  For example, suppose a team was 
ranked 21st in the fourth week of the season, and did not play in the fifth week of the season, but 
changed ranking to 19 in the fifth week.  In the sixth week the team played and their rank changed to 18.  
The change from the third to fourth week is recorded here, as is the change in the fifth to sixth week.  
When I ran specifications with the teams as "tied" for inactive weeks (the fourth to fifth in this example) 
the results were unchanged.   
Data was collected between March 2005 and December 2006.  The raw data was audited for 
accuracy using the following algorithm.  First, 3 seasons were randomly selected and these seasons were 
re-checked for each team.  Then, three weeks of seasons were randomly selected and these were 
checked for each team.  Finally, three teams were selected and their results re-checked.  In any instance, 
if more than 5% of the entries checked had to be changed for any reason that team’s entire entry was re-
done.  The auditing took place from January 2007 to June 2007.   
 
                                                 
51 The AP polls are for each week are listed at http://www.appollarchive.com/football/index.cfm  
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The largest changes in the poll is that beginning in 1990 25 teams were ranked instead of 20, as 
had been the case from before 1990.  In the data presented here, I weighted all 1980 to 1989 AP points 
by (25/20), which transforms the points as if there were 25 teams to be ranked in those polls.  This 
preserves the original ranking while at the same time awarding “contemporary” point totals.  Similarly, in 
different years there are different numbers of voters in the AP poll.  While this difference in levels is 
somewhat dealt with by the inclusion of season specific effects, I also standardized the point totals to 
control for differences in the number of AP voters.   
There are five additional checks that should be performed on the data.  The first is a check that 
acknowledges the changes in the AP poll, which until 1990 only ranked 20 teams.  A check, however, 
would be to throw out all rankings from 20-25 for all years after 1990.  Appendix Table A shows the 
results, which are robust to the exclusion of all teams ranked 21-25.  Similarly, the data here only records 
information on teams that are ranked both before and after the game.  Teams can, and do, place 
themselves onto the rankings and also drop from the top 25 throughout the course of a season.  Ideally, 
one would like to construct an imputed point total for each team, but that is not possible since an 
invented point total will not necessarily be consistent across all years.  To deal with this possibility, I 
imputed a rank of 30 for any team that was unranked before or after a game.  Appendix Table B shows 
the results, which regress the changes in rank on the game characteristics.  The results are robust, at least 
for the ranking regressions, when a teams former or current rank is imputed.  It is difficult to know how 
to interpret the effect of opponent strength in these regressions, however, because of the use of imputed 
rankings.  Bowl games and championship games may be the driving factors behind the results as they 
usually feature an inordinate number of high quality matchups.  I exclude Bowl Games and Conference 
Championship games from the data in Appendix Table C.  The results are not sensitive the exclusion of 
these teams.  Fourth, to deal with the concern that the results are driven by highly ranked teams, I 
excluded all teams ranked 1-5 from the regressions in Appendix Table D.  As the Table show, the 
results are robust to their exclusion.  Last, Appendix Table E replicates the regression of Column VI of 
Table 3 and includes week of the season in the specification.  The central results are robust to this 
alternative specification. 
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Boston College (BC) Notre Dame
Brigham Young (BYU) Ohio State
California (Cal) Oklahoma
California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Pennsylvania State (Penn State)




Iowa Texas Agricultural and Mechanical (Texas A&M)
Louisiana State (LSU)
Note:  The data used in the paper contains each game played by the teams listed above from the 
1980-1981 season to the 2004-2005 season.  Table 2
Summary Statistics
Ranking Measures
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Points Change 4199 1.83 186.94 -1007 910
Rank Change 4286 0.00 3.16 -12 16
Points of Team Before Game 4483 871.98 447.44 36 1850
Points of Team After Game 4463 870.67 449.60 3 1850
Rank of Team Before Game 4483 10.44 6.60 1 25
Rank of Team After Game 4463 10.35 6.56 1 25
Game Characteristics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Win 7502 0.75 0.43 0 1
Loss 7502 0.24 0.43 0 1
Tie 7502 0.01 0.12 0 1
Score of Team 7502 28.20 14.65 0 86
Score of Opponent 7502 19.23 12.10 0 82
Margin of Victory 7502 8.97 20.77 -77 81
Blowout Win  7502 0.37 0.48 0 1
Blowout Loss 7502 0.12 0.32 0 1
Close Win 7502 0.10 0.29 0 1
Close Loss 7502 0.08 0.27 0 1
Author's Calculations. See data appendix for definitions.I II III IV V VI
Win 174.7*** 124.1*** 193.9*** 191.1*** 193.7*** 192.8***
[9.64] [2.69] [2.96] [2.79] [2.83] [2.81]
Lose -169.3*** -133.2*** -221.0*** -274.2*** -292.0*** -289.3***
[-9.09] [-2.83] [-3.29] [-3.88] [-4.14] [-4.08]
Close Win -9.002 -7.943 -8.091 -8.352
[-0.90] [-0.79] [-0.81] [-0.84]
Close Loss 24.04* 28.95** 30.06** 29.64**
[1.71] [2.06] [2.14] [2.11]
Blowout Win 11.26* 8.654 8.472 8.835
[1.76] [1.35] [1.32] [1.25]
Blowout Loss -42.30*** -50.43*** -49.50*** -46.89***
[-3.13] [-3.71] [-3.65] [-3.05]
Opponent Strength 5.161*** 2.448 2.448 2.448
[9.24] [0.52] [0.52] [0.52]
Win * Opponent Strength 1.647 1.676 1.87
[0.35] [0.36] [0.40]
Lose * Opponent Strength 9.554* 9.082* 8.350*
[1.94] [1.85] [1.70]
Win Late in Season? -4.335 -5.092
[-0.67] [-0.53]
Lose Late in Season? 48.89*** 51.18***
[3.92] [3.59]
Win/Loss * Home /Away XXXXX
Close Win/Loss *Home/Away X
Blowout Win/Loss * Home/Away * Late X
Observations 5578 5578 3846 3846 3846 3846
R-squared 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.5 0.5 0.5
T statistics in brackets [***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<0.1]
Each column is a regression on the change in points in the AP poll on game characteristics.  Late in Season is defined as being after the
tenth (10) poll week of the season. Opponent strength is defined as the number of wins minus the number of losses of the opponent for
that season. Blowout is margin of victory >14, close is margin of victory <3.  See the data appendix for further description.
Table 3
Change in AP Points on Between Rank Game Characteristics Table 4
Game Characteristc Interactions
I II III IV V VI
Win Late in Season? -7.205 -2.998 -12.68 -2.998 -2.998 -1.276
[-0.67] [-0.28] [-1.13] [-0.47] [-0.40] [-0.15]
Lose Late in Season? 57.67*** 61.21*** 60.64*** 61.21*** 61.21*** 61.03***
[3.54] [3.77] [3.52] [3.24] [3.12] [3.35]
Win Late in Blowout? (Home) 6.259 6.567 7.48 6.567 6.567 5.053
[0.41] [0.43] [0.47] [0.51] [0.44] [0.43]
Lose Late in Blowout? (Home) -101.3 -112.9 -110.1 -112.9 -112.9 -112.3**
[-1.29] [-1.45] [-1.34] [-1.42] [-1.45] [-2.23]
Win Late in Blowout? (Away) -9.055 -11.26 -16.22 -11.26 -11.26 -12.67
[-0.50] [-0.62] [-0.85] [-0.93] [-0.89] [-1.11]
Lose Late in Blowout? (Away) -99.04 -94.91 -128.3* -94.91 -94.91 -94.3
[-1.60] [-1.53] [-1.93] [-1.21] [-1.37] [-1.40]
Win Late in Blowout? (Home) * Opp Str -0.309 -0.675 -1.482 -0.675 -0.675 -0.732
[-0.14] [-0.31] [-0.64] [-0.36] [-0.39] [-0.49]
Lose Late in Blowout? (Home) * Opp Str 18.51* 19.25* 20.86* 19.25*** 19.25* 19.23***
[1.70] [1.78] [1.83] [2.88] [1.75] [3.20]
Win Late in Blowout? (Away) *Opp Str -3.485 -3.919 -4.435 -3.919*** -3.919** -3.951***
[-1.27] [-1.43] [-1.55] [-3.05] [-2.55] [-5.26]
Lose Late in Blowout? (Away) * Opp Str 11.62 10.81 13.51 10.81 10.81 10.77
[1.44] [1.34] [1.55] [1.09] [1.10] [1.07]
Win Late Close? (Home) 3.518 7.83 20.13 7.83 7.83 4.714
[0.10] [0.22] [0.55] [0.46] [0.39] [0.21]
Lose Late Close? (Home) -80.13 -66.65 -68.57 -66.65 -66.65 -65.17
[-1.50] [-1.25] [-1.23] [-1.23] [-1.39] [-1.06]
Win Late Close? (Away) 20.82 20.57 34.18 20.57 20.57 17.75
[0.74] [0.73] [1.15] [1.27] [1.26] [1.32]
Lose Late Close? (Away) -125.7** -139.4** -194.3*** -139.4** -139.4** -139.2***
[-2.00] [-2.22] [-2.91] [-2.70] [-2.23] [-3.57]
Win Late Close? (Home) * Opp Strength -7.079 -6.738 -7.94 -6.738 -6.738 -6.757
[-1.04] [-1.00] [-1.13] [-0.92] [-0.86] [-0.67]
Lose Late Close? (Home) * Opp Strength 13.73* 12.33 13.03 12.33* 12.33** 12.25**
[1.77] [1.60] [1.61] [1.75] [2.16] [2.44]
Win Late Close? (Away) * Opp Strength 5.251 4.662 3.52 4.662 4.662 4.675**
[0.95] [0.84] [0.60] [1.28] [1.34] [2.14]
Lose Late Close? (Away) * Opp Strength 16.53* 18.47** 26.89*** 18.47** 18.47** 18.54***
[1.81] [2.03] [2.79] [2.28] [2.27] [3.38]
Season Effects, Team Effects,  XXXXX
Seaon * Team Effects XXXX
Team Cluster X
Season Cluster X
Week of Season Cluster X
Observations 3846 3846 3846 3846 3846 3845
R-squared 0.5 0.52 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.52
T statistics in brackets [***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1]
These are selected coefficients for the change in AP poll points as a function of game characteristics.  The
regressions included win, loss, home, away, win/loss*home/away, close/blowout*win/loss*home/away, 
opponent strength, and win/loss*opponent strength. 
See the data appendix for further details and variable definifions.  T-2 > 0 T-2 < 0
1 Week 2 Weeks 3 Weeks 1 Week 2 Weeks 3 Weeks T-1 < 0 T-1 > 0
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Win 211.5** 139.2 224.8*** 80.68 341.0*** 110.8 516.6** 344.1***
[2.56] [1.62] [2.69] [0.46] [3.08] [0.92] [2.29] [3.05]
Lose -274.4*** -343.0*** -243.6*** -362.4** -128.8 -441.5*** 81.86 -77
[-3.22] [-3.90] [-2.82] [-1.99] [-1.10] [-3.56] [0.36] [-0.64]
Close Win -4.515 -2.76 2.572 -18.78 -2.341 -60.11*** -29.49 6.94
[-0.36] [-0.22] [0.21] [-1.04] [-0.13] [-2.91] [-1.34] [0.31]
Close Loss 37.91** 41.73** 35.49** 7.866 -4.926 -0.226 16.04 -1.467
[2.24] [2.48] [2.10] [0.28] [-0.17] [-0.0074] [0.52] [-0.045]
Blowout Win 12.13 13.43* 11.2 -1.999 0.498 -7.974 -6.571 -4.182
[1.53] [1.67] [1.43] [-0.17] [0.043] [-0.62] [-0.45] [-0.31]
Blowout Loss -38.71** -60.82*** -51.39*** -85.08*** -57.93** -47.08 -96.15*** -51.37*
[-2.38] [-3.71] [-3.18] [-3.04] [-2.20] [-1.62] [-3.11] [-1.76]
Opponent Strength 2.665 2.364 0.745 -12.87 14.98 7.074 41.33* 17.26
[0.49] [0.43] [0.13] [-1.10] [1.35] [0.74] [1.88] [1.50]
Win * Opponent Strength 2.159 1.976 3.781 15.73 -11.24 -3.154 -39.09* -13.45
[0.39] [0.35] [0.66] [1.34] [-1.01] [-0.33] [-1.78] [-1.16]
Lose * Opponent Strength 11.40** 7.652 11.45* 18.75 -0.986 1.815 -38.70* -2.771
[1.99] [1.31] [1.94] [1.55] [-0.086] [0.18] [-1.74] [-0.23]
Win Late in Season -5.585 -6.133 -8.405 -0.741 0.969 2.281 -3.256 -2.061
[-0.70] [-0.77] [-1.09] [-0.062] [0.084] [0.18] [-0.24] [-0.15]
Lose Late in Season? 40.10*** 36.88** 41.74*** 75.21*** 93.71*** 69.98*** 64.27** 86.22***
[2.75] [2.50] [2.82] [2.81] [3.90] [2.69] [2.22] [3.22]
Win/Loss * Home /Away XXXXXX X X
Win/Loss * Opp Strength XXXXXX X X
Observations 2631 2547 2573 986 964 921 626 659
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.53 0.5 0.54 0.57
T statistics in brackets [***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<0.1] Each column is a regression on the change in points in the AP poll on game characteristics.  
Previous change is noted as a change given in the week noted only, sequence of previous change is conditioned on changes to the points in previous 
weeks as noted.  
See the data appendix for further description and variable definitions.
Table 5
Results For Teams Who Had
Previous Positive Change: Previous Negative Change:
Sequence of Previous Point Changes:
Validation Check: Results by Lagged Change in AP PointsTable 6
Validation Check: Results by Length of Winning Streak
Length of Winning Streak:
6 Games 5 Games 4 Games 3 Games 2 Games 1 Game
I II III IV V VI
Win 87.76 92.61 122.3 142.9* 114.1 201.3***
[1.08] [1.12] [1.40] [1.65] [1.48] [3.09]
Lose -412.8*** -420.7*** -363.6*** -358.1*** -413.2*** -304.4***
[-4.95] [-4.95] [-4.08] [-4.07] [-5.22] [-4.53]
Close Win 24.03* 18.87 11.04 7.651 -3.701 -6.209
[1.77] [1.49] [0.89] [0.67] [-0.34] [-0.61]
Close Loss 33.41* 32.00* 31.54* 39.04** 36.65** 33.47**
[1.92] [1.92] [1.92] [2.57] [2.46] [2.39]
Blowout Win 7.403 10.34 12.01 10.31 8.46 7.2
[0.88] [1.31] [1.57] [1.45] [1.23] [1.11]
Blowout Loss -92.28*** -75.41*** -74.74*** -73.07*** -47.58*** -51.14***
[-5.20] [-4.55] [-4.63] [-4.84] [-3.32] [-3.77]
Opponent Strength -5.345 -4.891 -0.155 1.503 -0.703 1.812
[-1.06] [-0.97] [-0.030] [0.32] [-0.15] [0.41]
Win * Opponent Strength 7.702 7.755 3.604 1.69 4.474 2.016
[1.51] [1.52] [0.69] [0.36] [0.94] [0.45]
Lose * Opponent Strength 18.67*** 17.86*** 13.47** 13.24*** 14.08*** 9.623**
[3.46] [3.34] [2.48] [2.66] [2.82] [2.04]
Win Late in Season? -22.60*** -20.90*** -24.02*** -18.94*** -16.36** -12.62*
[-2.73] [-2.65] [-3.11] [-2.61] [-2.33] [-1.91]
Lose Late in Season? 93.48*** 96.21*** 92.16*** 52.50*** 42.98*** 41.89***
[5.59] [6.19] [6.19] [3.84] [3.27] [3.36]
Win/Loss * Home /Away XXXXXX
Win/Loss * Opp Strength XXXXXX
Observations 1391 1699 2041 2426 2877 3367
R-squared 0.64 0.62 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.54
T statistics in brackets [***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<0.1]
Only teams who had won the previous number of games listed are included in each regression. 
Each column is a regression on the change in points in the AP poll on game characteristics.  
See the data appendix for further details and variable definifions.  Table 7
Season, Team Effects and Clustered Standard Error Estimates
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Win 187.7*** 245.9*** 187.7*** 245.9*** 187.7*** 245.9*** 192.3** 250.6***
[2.74] [3.43] [2.94] [3.14] [3.00] [2.94] [2.60] [3.17]
Lose -301.9*** -258.5*** -301.9*** -258.5*** -301.9*** -258.5** -300.3*** -257.0**
[-4.28] [-3.47] [-4.62] [-3.23] [-4.34] [-2.60] [-3.81] [-2.87]
Close Win -10.16 -12.24 -10.16 -12.24 -10.16 -12.24 -8.641 -10.66
[-1.02] [-1.16] [-0.93] [-0.93] [-0.90] [-1.00] [-0.80] [-1.11]
Close Loss 29.46** 29.59** 29.46 29.59 29.46 29.59 29.48 29.44
[2.10] [1.99] [1.41] [1.14] [1.36] [1.23] [1.05] [1.09]
Blowout Win 16.33** 26.38*** 16.33*** 26.38*** 16.33* 26.38*** 16.72** 26.85***
[2.29] [3.47] [2.99] [4.57] [2.04] [3.02] [2.39] [4.79]
Blowout Loss -48.83*** -53.31*** -48.83** -53.31* -48.83** -53.31** -48.83 -53.19
[-3.19] [-3.21] [-2.23] [-1.78] [-2.21] [-2.14] [-1.54] [-1.39]
Opponent Strength 2.401 3.523 2.401 3.523 2.401 3.523 2.448 3.535
[0.52] [0.72] [0.49] [0.56] [0.38] [0.44] [0.42] [0.54]
Win * Opponent Strength 2.387 2.087 2.387 2.087 2.387 2.087 2.395 2.126
[0.51] [0.42] [0.49] [0.33] [0.41] [0.27] [0.41] [0.33]
Lose * Opponent Strength 9.289* 9.120* 9.289* 9.12 9.289 9.12 9.235 9.088
[1.89] [1.75] [1.86] [1.45] [1.35] [1.11] [1.41] [1.26]
Win Late in Season? -0.6 -8.167 -0.6 -8.167 -0.6 -8.167 0.501 -7.047
[-0.062] [-0.81] [-0.086] [-1.06] [-0.089] [-1.08] [0.084] [-1.10]
Lose Late in Season? 54.96*** 53.59*** 54.96*** 53.59** 54.96*** 53.59** 54.99*** 53.49***
[3.87] [3.55] [3.28] [2.60] [3.19] [2.54] [5.08] [3.50]
Blowout/Close Win/Loss *Home/Away * Opp. Strength XXXXXXXX
Season Effects, Team Effects XXXXXXXX
Season, Team, Season * Team Effects XXXX
Cluster on Season XX
Cluster on Team XX
Cluster on Week of Season XX
Observations 3846 3846 3846 3846 3846 3846 3845 3845
R-squared 0.52 0.57 0.52 0.57 0.52 0.57 0.52 0.57
T statistics in brackets [***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<0.1] Each column is a regression on the change in points in the AP poll on game characteristics.  
See the data appendix for further description and variable definitions.Table 8
Summary Statistics For Late Season Games
Week 8 & After Week 9 & After Week 10 & After Week 11 & After
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean
Points Change 0.73 -0.57 -0.93 -5.34
(184.2) (181.9) (176.7) (172.3)
Rank Change -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02
(3.0) (2.9) (2.9) (2.9)
Points Before Game 885.79 889.07 893.88 899.74
(455.0) (455.5) (456.0) (456.9)
Points  After Game 880.67 883.77 887.33 887.16
(456.6) (457.0) (457.5) (460.3)
Rank Before Game 10.42 10.38 10.37 10.36
(6.7) (6.7) (6.7) (6.7)
Rank After Game 10.35 10.36 10.33 10.35
(6.6) (6.7) (6.7) (6.7)
Win 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.76
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
Loss 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
Tie 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Score of Team 27.47 27.27 26.82 26.39
(14.4) (14.4) (14.1) (13.7)
Score of Opponent 20.06 20.37 20.53 21.02
(12.3) (12.3) (12.3) (12.1)
Margin of Victory 7.41 6.91 6.29 5.37
(20.3) (20.3) (19.8) (19.3)
Blowout Win  0.51 0.52 0.54 0.57
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Blowout Loss 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Close Win 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
(0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2)
Close Loss 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Author's Calculations.  Standard errors under mean values in parentheses.
See the data appendix for definitions. Table 9
Alternative Definitions of Late Weeks of Season
Late Defined as Week of Season Greater or Equal to:
Week 8 Week 9 Week 10 Week 11
I II III IV
Win 193.3*** 195.0*** 192.8*** 193.9***
[2.82] [2.85] [2.81] [2.83]
Lose -292.0*** -294.1*** -289.3*** -284.8***
[-4.13] [-4.16] [-4.08] [-4.03]
Close Win -8.038 -8.022 -8.352 -7.854
[-0.80] [-0.80] [-0.84] [-0.79]
Close Loss 30.59** 32.06** 29.64** 28.82**
[2.17] [2.28] [2.11] [2.05]
Blowout Win 8.601 8.58 8.835 8.327
[1.34] [1.34] [1.25] [1.30]
Blowout Loss -51.16*** -51.16*** -46.89*** -51.10***
[-3.77] [-3.77] [-3.05] [-3.76]
Opponent Strength 2.448 2.448 2.448 2.448
[0.52] [0.52] [0.52] [0.52]
Win * Opponent Strength 1.652 1.658 1.87 1.703
[0.35] [0.35] [0.40] [0.36]
Lose * Opponent Strength 9.408* 9.216* 8.350* 9.463*
[1.92] [1.88] [1.70] [1.93]
Win Late in Season?  -1.115 -1.769 -5.092 -8.948
[-0.20] [-0.30] [-0.53] [-1.17]
Lose Late in Season?  35.06*** 46.07*** 51.18*** 28.77**
[3.07] [3.92] [3.59] [2.04]
Win/Lose * Home/Away XXXX
Blowout Win/Loss * Home/Away XXXX
Close Win/Loss * Home/Away XXXX
Blowout/Close *Home/Away * Late XXXX
Win/Loss * Opp. Strength XXXX
Observations 3846 3846 3846 3846
R-squared 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
T statistics in brackets [***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<0.1]
Each column is a regression on the change in points in the AP poll on game characteristics. 
See the data appendix for further details and variable definifions.  Table 10
Strength of Opponent Check Using Games With Both Teams Ranked
I II III IV V VI
Win 248.4*** 248.4*** 256.3*** 231.8** 231.8** 241.4**
[5.94] [4.71] [4.81] [2.53] [2.09] [2.28]
Lose -188.5*** -188.5*** -194.9*** -303.0** -303.0** -297.8***
[-3.03] [-3.78] [-4.17] [-2.49] [-2.79] [-3.29]
Close Win -22.91 -22.91 -20.14 -28.81 -28.81 -24.39
[-0.93] [-1.33] [-1.36] [-1.10] [-1.62] [-1.55]
Close Loss 38.34* 38.34 41.51 38.1 38.1 38.81
[2.05] [1.67] [1.51] [1.70] [1.63] [1.25]
Blowout Win -4.044 -4.044 -3.65 -5.536 -5.536 -4.51
[-0.23] [-0.38] [-0.34] [-0.30] [-0.39] [-0.38]
Blowout Loss -66.03*** -66.03*** -64.37** -75.08*** -75.08*** -75.40**
[-3.23] [-4.18] [-2.52] [-3.08] [-4.07] [-2.51]
Win Late in Season? -35.13** -35.13** -35.62** -38.39** -38.39*** -35.39**
[-2.73] [-2.77] [-2.32] [-2.79] [-3.17] [-2.39]
Lose Late in Season? 94.46*** 94.46*** 92.13*** 72.26** 72.26*** 72.39***
[3.93] [4.47] [4.90] [2.80] [3.12] [3.90]
Win * Opponent Rank -100.9 -100.9 -87.15 -24.11 -24.11 -18.58
[-1.11] [-0.84] [-0.84] [-0.29] [-0.20] [-0.20]
Lose * Opponent Rank -76.7 -76.7 -72.63 -111.6 -111.6 -111.1
[-0.65] [-0.68] [-0.76] [-0.95] [-0.95] [-1.19]
Opponent Strength -2.761 -2.761 -2.858
 [-0.26] [-0.26] [-0.30]
Win * Opponent Strength -0.431 -0.431 0.106
[-0.041] [-0.037] [0.011]
Lose * Opponent Strength 12.3 12.3 12.16
[1.12] [1.16] [1.37]
Win/Loss * Home /Away XXXXXX
Close Win/Loss XXXXXX
Blowout Win/Loss XXXXXX
Close Win/Loss *Home/Away XXXXXX
Blowout Win/Loss *Home/Away XXXXXX
Blowout/Close * Win/Loss * Late in Season XXXXXX
Blowout Win/Loss * Home/Away * Opp Str X X X
Season, Team Effects XXXXXX
Sean * Team Effects XXXXXX
Team Cluster X X
Season Cluster X X
Week of Season Cluster X X
Observations 1348 1348 1309 1115 1115 1114
R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.6 0.61 0.61 0.62
T statistics in brackets [***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<0.1].  Opponent rank is defined as 1/Ranking, so that 
teams of higher rank are ranked higher.  Each column is a regression on the change in points in the AP poll 
on game characteristics. 
See the data appendix for further description and variable definitions.I II III IV V VI
Win 189.1*** 190.9*** 174.2** 167.4** 167.4** 163.7**
[2.76] [2.79] [2.53] [2.57] [2.48] [2.46]
Lose -285.3*** -290.2*** -277.1*** -312.7*** -312.7*** -302.6***
[-4.03] [-4.10] [-3.91] [-4.81] [-5.04] [-3.98]
Point Differential 0.418 0.127
[1.48] [0.42]
Losing Differential 3.074** -0.759 -0.759 0.171
[2.49] [-0.31] [-0.20] [0.078]
Winning Differential 0.271 0.0962 0.0962 0.183
[0.93] [0.27] [0.30] [0.90]
Opponent Strength 2.448 2.448 2.321 2.321 2.382
[0.52] [0.52] [0.36] [0.47] [0.41]
Differential * Opponent Strength -0.109**
[-2.83]
Winning Differential * Opponent Strength -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.189***
[-5.91] [-5.90] [-4.75]
Losing Differential * Opponent Strength 0.559** 0.559 0.517*
[2.29] [1.18] [1.92]
Win Late in Season? -5.19 -6.17 -5.16 -2.45 -2.45 -0.838
[-0.54] [-0.64] [-0.54] [-0.37] [-0.37] [-0.14]
Lose Late in Season? 51.13*** 51.24*** 50.89*** 54.61*** 54.61*** 54.28***
[3.58] [3.59] [3.57] [3.10] [3.22] [5.48]
Win/Loss * Home /Away XXXXXX
Win/Loss * Opp Strength XXXXXX
Season, Team Effects X X X
Sean * Team Effects X X X
Team Cluster X
Season Cluster X
Week of Season Cluster X
Observations 3846 3846 3846 3846 3846 3845
R-squared 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.52 0.52 0.52
T statistics in brackets [***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<0.1].  Differential is defined as the point differential
such that losing teams have negative point differentials and winning teams have positive point differentials.
Each column is a regression on the change in points in the AP poll on game characteristics.
See the data appendix for further description and variable definitions.
Table 11
Margin of Victory Check using Game Point DifferentialAppendix Table A
Truncation Check: Point Results for Teams Ranked 1-20 Only
I II III IV V
Win 190.8*** 190.8*** 248.2*** 248.2*** 252.2***
[2.90] [2.89] [3.23] [3.58] [3.36]
Lose -316.0*** -312.5*** -269.7*** -269.7*** -268.4***
[-4.64] [-4.58] [-2.81] [-3.78] [-2.97]
Close Win -10.69 -10.91 -14.06 -14.06 -12.69
[-1.06] [-1.09] [-1.27] [-1.03] [-1.07]
Close Loss 32.10** 31.67** 29.62 29.62 29.24
[2.32] [2.29] [1.36] [1.13] [1.07]
Blowout Win 6.363 6.078 19.88*** 19.88*** 20.32***
[1.00] [0.86] [2.97] [3.12] [3.03]
Blowout Loss -61.93*** -60.58*** -63.49** -63.49* -63.57
[-4.59] [-3.95] [-2.21] [-1.91] [-1.47]
Opponent Strength 2.697 2.697 3.535 3.535 3.55
[0.60] [0.60] [0.44] [0.54] [0.52]
Win * Opponent Strength 1.017 1.164 1.267 1.267 1.301
[0.22] [0.26] [0.16] [0.19] [0.19]
Lose * Opponent Strength 10.85** 10.14** 11.05 11.05* 11.04
[2.28] [2.13] [1.29] [1.73] [1.51]
Win Late in Season? -8.059 -10.19 -14.04* -14.04** -13.01*
[-1.24] [-1.05] [-1.87] [-2.21] [-1.83]
Lose Late in Season? 52.69*** 53.60*** 52.48** 52.48** 52.13***
[4.30] [3.83] [2.38] [2.37] [2.94]
Win/Loss * Home /Away XXXXX
Win/Loss * Opp Strength XXXXX
Close Win/Loss *Home/Away XXXXX
Blowout Win/Loss *Home/Away XXXXX
Blowout/Close * Win/Loss * Late in Season XXXX
Blowout Win/Loss * Home/Away * Opp Str XXXX
Season, Team Effects, Season * Team Effects X X X
Team Cluster X
Season Cluster X
Week of Season Cluster X
Observations 3590 3590 3590 3590 3589
R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.6 0.6 0.6
T statistics in brackets [***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<0.1]
Each column is a regression on the change in points in the AP poll on game characteristics. 
Only Teams Ranked 1-20 before the game was played are included in these regressions.
See the data appendix for further description and variable definitions.Appendix Table B
Truncation Check: Ranking Results with Imputed Rankings
I II III IV V VI VII
Win -5.419*** -3.912** -3.648** -3.755** -3.648*** -3.648*** -3.683***
[-9.10] [-2.41] [-2.26] [-2.34] [-5.69] [-5.43] [-7.05]
Lose 2.895*** 5.422*** 5.755*** 5.742*** 5.755*** 5.755*** 5.745***
[4.95] [3.28] [3.49] [3.48] [7.61] [7.35] [5.92]
Close Win  -0.122 -0.123 -0.085 0.0391 -0.085 -0.085 -0.0956
[-0.51] [-0.52] [-0.36] [0.17] [-0.41] [-0.39] [-0.36]
Close Loss -0.982*** -0.986*** -0.890*** -0.704** -0.890** -0.890** -0.891*
[-3.20] [-3.21] [-2.91] [-2.26] [-2.45] [-2.41] [-1.77]
Blowout Win -0.0644 -0.0686 -0.187 -0.455*** -0.187 -0.187 -0.188**
[-0.42] [-0.45] [-1.22] [-2.95] [-1.19] [-1.09] [-2.14]
Blowout Loss 0.268 0.205 0.257 0.519 0.257 0.257 0.257
[0.84] [0.64] [0.80] [1.57] [0.41] [0.68] [0.50]
Opponent Strength -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.115*** -0.128*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.116***
[-8.15] [-8.11] [-8.79] [-9.84] [-5.50] [-7.88] [-7.62]
Win Late in Season? -0.229 -0.221 -0.286* -0.0372 -0.286 -0.286** -0.291**
[-1.45] [-1.40] [-1.79] [-0.24] [-1.30] [-2.14] [-2.54]
Lose Late in Season? -1.039*** -1.112*** -1.086*** -1.009*** -1.086** -1.086*** -1.086***
[-3.24] [-3.45] [-3.38] [-3.09] [-2.55] [-3.75] [-3.45]
Win/Loss * Home /Away XXXXXXX
Win/Loss * Opp Strength XXXXXX
Blowout/Close Win/Loss* Home/Away* Opp Strength XXXXXX
Season Effects, Team Effects XXXXX
Season * Team Effects XXXX
Cluster on Team X
Cluster on Season X
Cluster on Week of Season X
Observations 4350 4350 4350 4350 4350 4350 4349
R-squared 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.54 0.43 0.43 0.43
T statistics in brackets [***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<0.1].  Teams unranked before or after the game are given a missing rank of 30.
Each column is a regression on the change in rank in the AP poll on game characteristics.  
See the data appendix for further description and variable definitions.I II III IV V VI
Win 197.8*** 196.3*** 252.6*** 193.0*** 193.0*** 193.0**
[2.89] [2.86] [3.51] [3.10] [3.04] [2.58]
Lose -312.1*** -306.6*** -272.7*** -319.0*** -319.0*** -319.0***
[-4.38] [-4.30] [-3.63] [-4.41] [-4.79] [-3.77]
Close Win -4.9 -5.138 -9.613 -6.942 -6.942 -6.942
[-0.49] [-0.51] [-0.90] [-0.61] [-0.63] [-0.63]
Close Loss 28.67** 28.10** 28.00* 28.25 28.25 28.25
[2.03] [1.99] [1.87] [1.29] [1.38] [1.00]
Blowout Win 9.094 9.876 27.57*** 17.52** 17.52*** 17.52**
[1.41] [1.38] [3.60] [2.19] [3.19] [2.48]
Blowout Loss -51.91*** -54.42*** -59.52*** -55.85** -55.85** -55.85
[-3.78] [-3.48] [-3.52] [-2.34] [-2.64] [-1.67]
Opponent Strength 2.448 2.448 3.56 2.473 2.473 2.473
[0.52] [0.52] [0.72] [0.39] [0.50] [0.42]
Win * Opponent Strength 1.698 1.921 2.132 2.377 2.377 2.377
[0.36] [0.41] [0.43] [0.40] [0.49] [0.40]
Lose * Opponent Strength 8.748* 8.073 9.027* 9.023 9.023* 9.023
[1.78] [1.64] [1.73] [1.30] [1.80] [1.37]
Win Late in Season? -3.241 -3.135 -7.475 0.644 0.644 0.644
[-0.49] [-0.32] [-0.72] [0.097] [0.090] [0.11]
Lose Late in Season? 46.81*** 44.10*** 46.09*** 47.31*** 47.31*** 47.31***
[3.67] [3.00] [2.97] [3.05] [2.94] [4.61]
Win/Loss * Home /Away XXXXXX
Close Win/Loss XXXXXX
Blowout Win/Loss XXXXXX
Win/Loss * Opp Strength XXXXXX
Close Win/Loss *Home/Away XXXXX
Blowout Win/Loss *Home/Away XXXXX
Blowout/Close * Win/Loss * Late in Season XXXXX
Blowout Win/Loss * Home/Away * Opp Str XXXXX
Season, Team Effects, Season * Team Effects XXXX
Team Cluster X
Season Cluster X
Week of Season Cluster X
Observations 3492 3492 3492 3492 3492 3492
R-squared 0.5 0.5 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.52
T statistics in brackets [***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1] 
Each column is a regression on the change in points in the AP poll on game characteristics.
Regressions include all games excpet championship games and bowl games.  See the data appendix for the definition of variable
Appendix Table C
Truncation Check: Eliminating Bowl Games and Conference Championship GamesI II III IV V VI VII
Win 254.2*** 253.4*** 246.1*** 300.9*** 246.1** 246.1*** 254.6**
[2.89] [2.88] [2.77] [3.18] [2.77] [2.95] [2.89]
Lose -264.3*** -265.4*** -274.4*** -230.1** -274.4*** -274.4*** -272.4***
[-2.94] [-2.94] [-3.02] [-2.36] [-3.32] [-2.86] [-3.04]
Close Win -10.64 -11.04 -12.8 -9.513 -12.8 -12.8 -10.84
[-0.90] [-0.93] [-1.07] [-0.73] [-1.00] [-0.91] [-0.90]
Close Loss 29.62* 29.26* 30.68* 23.99 30.68 30.68 30.68
[1.72] [1.70] [1.77] [1.27] [1.21] [1.08] [0.89]
Blowout Win 18.9 19.37 22.97* 29.20** 22.97** 22.97** 23.52*
[1.42] [1.25] [1.64] [2.04] [2.29] [2.41] [1.78]
Blowout Loss -50.14*** -44.90** -44.79** -53.47*** -44.79 -44.79 -44.81
[-3.10] [-2.44] [-2.42] [-2.61] [-1.70] [-1.69] [-1.35]
Opponent Strength 2.406 2.406 2.613 3.053 2.613 2.613 2.683
[0.39] [0.39] [0.42] [0.45] [0.39] [0.36] [0.35]
Win * Opponent Strength 3.712 3.944 3.957 4.255 3.957 3.957 3.982
[0.60] [0.64] [0.63] [0.63] [0.60] [0.59] [0.54]
Lose * Opponent Strength 10.19 9.673 9.82 10.55 9.82 9.82 9.734
[1.59] [1.50] [1.52] [1.49] [1.50] [1.43] [1.16]
Win Late in Season? -0.778 -1.476 1.293 -7.007 1.293 1.293 2.782
[-0.095] [-0.12] [0.11] [-0.54] [0.14] [0.15] [0.43]
Lose Late in Season? 37.37** 42.33** 43.64** 35.33* 43.64** 43.64** 43.60***
[2.48] [2.44] [2.50] [1.87] [2.41] [2.19] [3.33]
Win/Loss * Home /Away XXXXXXX
Win/Loss * Opp Strength XXXXXXX
Close Win/Loss *Home/Away XXXXXX
Blowout Win/Loss *Home/Away XXXXXX
Season Effects, Team Effects XXXXX
Season*Team Effects XXXX
Cluster on Season X
Cluster on Team X
Cluster on Week of Season X
Observations 2869 2869 2869 2869 2869 2869 2868
R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.57 0.5 0.5 0.5
T statistics in brackets [***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1] Each column is a regression on the change in points in the AP poll on game
characteristics.  Regressions include all games excpet those where the team was ranked 1-5 in the last poll before the game. 
See the data appendix for variable definitions and further description.
Appendix Table D
Truncation Check:  Results for Team's Not in the Top 5 Appendix Table E
Specification Check: Addition of Week of Season to the Specification
I II III IV V VI VII
Win 192.8*** 197.6*** 250.8*** 250.8*** 250.8*** 122.5 179.8**
[2.81] [2.88] [3.19] [3.01] [3.18] [1.55] [2.17]
Lose -289.3*** -287.6*** -257.0*** -257.0** -257.0** -352.1*** -331.6***
[-4.08] [-4.06] [-3.22] [-2.58] [-2.87] [-4.27] [-3.81]
Close Win -8.352 -6.842 -10.65 -10.65 -10.65 -6.778 -10.56
[-0.84] [-0.68] [-0.81] [-0.88] [-1.11] [-0.68] [-1.00]
Close Loss 29.64** 29.65** 29.46 29.46 29.46 29.62** 29.65**
[2.11] [2.11] [1.14] [1.23] [1.09] [2.11] [2.00]
Blowout Win 8.835 9.261 26.89*** 26.89*** 26.89*** 9.36 26.95***
[1.25] [1.31] [4.71] [3.12] [4.85] [1.32] [3.55]
Blowout Loss -46.89*** -46.96*** -53.28* -53.28** -53.28 -46.70*** -53.36***
[-3.05] [-3.06] [-1.78] [-2.13] [-1.40] [-3.04] [-3.21]
Opponent Strength 2.448 2.46 3.541 3.541 3.541 2.044 3.125
[0.52] [0.53] [0.56] [0.44] [0.54] [0.44] [0.64]
Win * Opponent Strength 1.87 1.907 2.123 2.123 2.123 2.325 2.539
[0.40] [0.40] [0.34] [0.28] [0.33] [0.49] [0.51]
Lose * Opponent Strength 8.350* 8.340* 9.091 9.091 9.091 8.748* 9.508*
[1.70] [1.69] [1.44] [1.11] [1.26] [1.78] [1.83]
Win Late in Season? -5.092 -6.027 -8.325 -8.325 -8.325 -10.02 -9.885
[-0.53] [-0.52] [-0.68] [-0.81] [-0.98] [-0.83] [-0.80]
Lose Late in Season? 51.18*** 49.32*** 52.29** 52.29** 52.29*** 56.35*** 48.14**
[3.59] [3.15] [2.75] [2.64] [3.49] [2.66] [2.12]
Week of Season 0.283 0.205 0.205 0.205 -9.919* -9.796*
[0.29] [0.16] [0.19] [0.23] [-1.76] [-1.65]
Win * Week of Season 10.81* 10.23*
[1.89] [1.69]
Lose * Week of Season 9.131 10.69
[1.49] [1.64]
Win/Loss * Home /Away XXXXXXX
Close * Home/Away XXXXXXX
Blowout * Home/Away XXXXXXX
Close * Home/Away * Late XXXXXXX
Blowout * Home/Away * Late XXXXXXX
Season, Team Effects X X X X
Season * Team Effects X X X X
Season Cluster X
Team Cluster X
Week of Season Cluster X
Observations 3846 3846 3846 3846 3846 3846 3846
R-squared 0.5 0.5 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.5 0.57
T statistics in brackets [***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<0.1]
Each column is a regression on the change in points in the AP poll on game characteristics.  Column I is a replication of 
Column VI from Table 3. 
See the data appendix for further description and variable definitions.